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INDIVISIBLE LABOR, LOTTERIES AND 
IDIOSYNCRATIC PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS 
 








This paper extends the indivisible-labor model by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson 
(1988) to include multiple consumers who differ in initial wealth and whose labor 
productivities are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In the presence of idiosyncratic 
uncertainty, the optimal allocations for the individual employment probabilities 
are at corners: agents work with probability one (zero) when their productivities 
are high (low). As in Hansen (1985), each agent in our indivisible-labor economy 
behaves as if her labor choice was divisible and her utility function was linear in 
hours worked. However, the quasi-linearity of the social preferences, established 
in Hansen (1985) for the homogeneous-agent case, does not survive after the 
introduction of idiosyncratic shocks. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the benchmark neoclassical growth model by Kydland and Prescott (1982),
the agent can dedicate any fraction of the total time endowment to work, i.e.,
hours worked are perfectly divisible. An important shortcoming of such a
model is that it predicts too little variability in hours worked,since the labor
supply elasticity of ”standard” CRRA type of preferences is not su¢ciently
large. In order to account for the variability of hours worked in the data,
therefore, it is tempting to assume in…nite labor supply elasticity, i.e., to
assume quasi-linear preferences that are strictly concave in consumption and
linear in labor. The problem is that such preferences are at odds with micro-
study estimates (see Browning et al., 1999, for a discussion).
There is one institutional setup in which high macro labor supply elas-
ticity can be reconciled with micro-studies, as shown in Hansen (1985) and
Rogerson (1988). If there is a continuum of identical agents who have addi-
tive utility functions, if labor is indivisible (i.e., if agents can work either a
…xed number of hours or not at all), and if agents choose employment proba-
bilities by trading lotteries, then the indivisible-labor economy behaves like a
representative-agent divisible-labor economy with a linear disutility of labor.
In this paper, we study the robustness of Hansen’s (1985) and Rogerson’s
2(1988) result to the introduction of heterogeneity.1 We speci…cally assume
that agents have di¤erent endowments of wealth and that their labor produc-
tivities are subject to idiosyncratic (possibly persistent) shocks.2 The fact
that these two types of heterogeneity are important for understanding aggre-
gate ‡uctuations and, in particular, those of the labor market in the data,
has been emphasized in Maliar and Maliar (2003a) in the context of Kydland
and Prescott’s (1982) divisible-labor model. Our objective is, therefore, to
investigate how such heterogeneity can a¤ect the aggregate implications of
the indivisible-labor model.
Our results are as follows: In the presence of idiosyncratic productivity
shocks, the optimal allocations for the individual employment probabilities
are at corners (i.e., they are equal to either zero or one). In spite of the
fact that our solution is not interior as in Hansen (1985), we still have that
each agent acts as if her labor choice was divisible and her utility function
was linear in labor. In our case, the equivalence between the individual
behavior in the indivisible and divisible-labor economies takes the following
1The heterogeneous-agent literature which employs the assumption of indivisible labor
includes, e.g., Cho (1995), Prasad (1996), and Maliar and Maliar (2000). A model with
ex-ante identical agents by Cho (1995) is a particular case of our general setup.
2There is vast literature on heterogeneous agents that advocates the importance of het-
erogeneity in labor productivity resulting from idiosyncratic shocks, e.g., Huggett (1993),
Aiyagari (1994), Kydland (1995), Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez and Ríos-Rull (1998), Krusell
and Smith (1998), Maliar and Maliar (2003a,b).
3form: an agent in the indivisible-labor economy works with probability one
(zero) if and only if the corresponding agent in the divisible-labor quasi-
linear economy works a maximum possible number of hours (does not work).
At the aggregate level, the quasi-linearity of preferences of the representative
consumer, established in Hansen (1985) for the homogeneous-agent case, does
not survive after the introduction of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In our
setup, the preferences of the ”representative consumer” depend not only on
aggregate variables but also on the heterogeneity parameters and are, in
general, not quasi-linear.3 An important implication of our results is that
indivisibility and lotteries are (a priori) no longer a su¢cient ”trick” for
getting enough variability of hours worked in real business cycle models.
To see the intuition behind our results, we shall note that in our indivisible-
labor economy, an individual expected momentary utility function is linear in
the employment probability. If agents are equally productive in all periods,
as in Hansen’s (1985) homogeneous-agent case, they do not care about which
periods they work and in which they enjoy leisure time. As a result, we can
construct a symmetric equilibrium in which all agents choose identical em-
ployment probabilities, so that there exists a representative consumer whose
3We employ Constantinides’s (1982) notion of the representative consumer, which does
not, in general, imply the existence of Gorman’s (1953) representative consumer. See
Maliar and Maliar (2003a) for a detailed discussion and further examples.
4utility function is linear in the employment probability. However, if agents
are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the symmetric equilibrium
does not exist; agents, now, are no longer indi¤erent about which periods they
work and in which they have leisure time: they work with the probability one
(zero) when their productivities are high (low). The corner solutions break
down the quasi-linearity of the preferences of the representative consumer.
We shall …nally note that our results are of potential use in the area of
international economics. To be speci…c, there is a body of the literature
that studies international business cycles in the context of a two-country
neoclassical growth model by considering a planner’s solution, e.g., Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995). If labor is indivisible
and if each country is a¤ected by a country-speci…c productivity shock, we
can extend a two-country analysis to a multi-country case in a relatively
simple fashion. All our results carry over to multi-country economies if we
re-interpret heterogeneous agents as countries.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a heterogenous-
agent variant of the indivisible-labor economy. Section 3 formulates an equiv-
alent quasi-linear divisible-labor economy and presents the results concerning
the properties of equilibrium in the indivisible-labor economy, and …nally,
5Section 4 concludes.
2 The indivisible-labor economy
We consider a complete-market heterogeneous-agent variant of the neoclas-
sical growth model by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). In such a model,
the individual labor choice is indivisible: agents can either work a …xed num-
ber of hours (be employed) or work zero hours (be unemployed).
Time is discrete and the horizon is in…nite: t 2 T,w h e r eT = f0;1;:::;1g:
The economy is populated by a continuum of in…nitely-lived agents with the
names on a unit interval S ´ [0;1], an output producing …rm and an insur-
ance company. The total measure (mass) of agents is one,
R
S ds =1 ,a n d
therefore, the average and aggregate values in our economy coincide. We
assume two types of heterogeneity, initial endowment and labor productiv-
ity (or skills). The individual skills are subject to idiosyncratic shocks and,
therefore, change with time.
We denote a labor productivity shock of agent s in period t by ¯
s
t and





+.W ea s s u m et h a tBt follows a stationary …rst-order
Markov process. Speci…cally, let < be the Borel ¾-algebra on =. A transition
function for the distribution of shocks ¦:=£<![0;1] is de…ned on the
6measurable space (=;<) in the following way: for each z 2= , ¦(z;¢) is a
probability measure on (=;<) and for each Z 2< , ¦(¢;Z) is a <-measurable
function. The function ¦(z;Z) shall be interpreted as the probability that
the next-period distribution of shocks lies in the set Z, given that the cur-
rent distribution of shocks is z, i.e., ¦(z;Z)=P rfBt+1 2 Z j Bt = zg.T h e
initial distribution of shocks B0 2=is given. Under these assumptions, id-
iosyncratic shocks can be correlated across agents, so that our economy can
have uncertainty at the aggregate level.
An agent s maximizes the expected lifetime utility, discounted with the
factor ± 2 (0;1), by choosing consumption and the employment probability.
At the beginning of each period, the agent plays an employment lottery.
If the agent wins, she works a …xed number of hours, n.I n t h e o p p o s i t e
case, she does not work at all. Before playing the lottery, the agent can buy
unemployment insurance, which pays one unit of consumption if the agent
is unemployed and zero otherwise. Markets are complete, i.e., the agents are
permitted to trade Arrow securities. The agent is endowed with one unit
of time, so that leisure in the employed and unemployed states is given by
1 ¡ n and 1, respectively. The agent owns the capital stock and rents it to
the …rm. Capital depreciates at the rate d 2 (0;1].




















































































, and initial en-
dowment (ks
0;m s
0 (Z0)) is given. Here, the superscript j 2f e;ug refers to




t+1 denote consumption and
capital in state j, ys
t and q('s
t) are the quantity of unemployment insur-






Z2< is the portfolio of Arrow securities, pt (Z) is the price of an
Arrow security that pays one unit of consumption if Bt+1 2 Z; rt and wt are
the prices of capital and e¢ciency labor, respectively; and, …nally, 's
t and
8(1 ¡ 's
t) are the probabilities of the employed and unemployed states, re-
spectively. The momentary utility function, u, is continuously di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing in both arguments and strictly concave.















tds are the capital and labor inputs,
respectively. The production function, f, has constant returns to scale, is
strictly concave, continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing with respect
to both arguments and satis…es the appropriate Inada conditions.
As in Hansen (1985), we assume that the insurance company maximizes


















In order to insure the no-arbitrage condition, we assume that the re-selling
of insurance contracts between agents is not allowed.
De…nition. A competitive equilibrium in the economy (1) ¡ (6) is a se-
quence of contingency plans for the consumers’ allocations, the …rm’s alloca-
tion, the insurance company’s allocation and the prices, such that, given the
9prices, the allocation of each consumer solves the utility maximization prob-
lem (1)¡(4), the allocation of the …rm solves the pro…t-maximization problem
(5), the allocation of the insurance company solves the pro…t-maximization
problem (6); capital, labor and security markets clear, and the economy’s
Resource Constraint (RC),
ct + kt+1 =( 1¡ d)kt + f (kt;h t); (7)
is satis…ed. The equilibrium quantities are to be such that c
s;j
t ;y s
t;w t;r t ¸ 0
for all t; s. We restrict attention to a recursive Markov equilibrium. It is
assumed that such an equilibrium exists and is unique.
3 The divisible-labor quasi-linear economy
In this paper, we restrict our attention to the case in which the individual
momentary utility functions are identical and additive:
u(c;l)=v (c)+$(l); (8)
where v0 > 0, v00 < 0, $0 > 0 and $00 < 0. Note that the above utility
function is not quasi-linear, as both v(c) and $(l) are strictly concave.
It turns out that, with the above assumption of additivity, there is a
direct connection between the indivisible and divisible-labor economies. To
10be speci…c, let us consider a heterogeneous-agent variant of Kydland and







































t · n; (11)















worked, consumption, capital and Arrow securities of agent s, respectively,
and A<0 is the utility-function parameter. The production side of the






We characterize the relationship between the indivisible and divisible-
labor economies with the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Assume that agents have identical additive utility functions
(8) and let A ´ ($(1 ¡ n) ¡ $(1))=n. Then, the individual variables in
the indivisible-labor economy (1) ¡ (6) and in the divisible-labor quasi-linear


















for all s, t, j, Z.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, the agents’ behavior in the indivisible-labor economy is indistin-
guishable from that in the divisible-labor quasi-linear economy. Regarding
the employment decisions, we have that agents in the indivisible-labor econ-
omy behave as if their labor choice was divisible and their preferences were
linear in labor. The decisions of agents on consumption and savings are
independent of their current employment status (i.e., the employed and un-
employed have the same consumption, capital and Arrow securities), which
is a result of perfect risk sharing.
Maliar and Maliar (2003b) study the properties of equilibrium in the
divisible-labor quasi-linear economy (9) ¡ (11) and show in particular that
its aggregate behavior can be described by a one-consumer model. We re-
produce this one-consumer model, below, since, under the equivalence result
of Proposition 1, such a model also describes the aggregate behavior of the
indivisible-labor economy (1) ¡ (6).
12Let us …rst formulate a planner’s economy that generates the same equilib-
rium allocation as the one in the decentralized quasi-linear economy (9)¡(11).











































where ct is the aggregate consumption, and f¸
sg
s2S ½ RS
+ is the distribution
of welfare weights with its mean being normalized to one,
R
S ¸
sds =1 .W e
















Note that the social utility function can depend not only on aggregate quan-





The relationship between the economy (9) ¡ (11) and the economy (12),
(13) is as follows:
Proposition 2 Assume that the agents in the divisible-labor quasi-linear
economy (9)¡(11) have identical additive utility functions (8). Then, the ag-
gregate behavior of such an economy is described by the one-consumer model
4This construction was initially proposed by Constatinides (1982). Maliar and Maliar
(2003a) use a similar planner’s problem representation to simplify the description of the
equilibrium in the heterogeneous-agent version of Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) model
with strictly convex individual preferences.































































< 0 ) ns
t =0
> 0 ) ns
t = n
=0 ) 0 · ns
t · n
; (15)
and where V1 and W1 denote the …rst-order partial derivatives of V and W
with respect to ct and ht, correspondingly.
Proof. See Maliar and Maliar (2003b).
We now employ the results of Propositions 1 and 2 to describe some
properties of the equilibrium in the indivisible-labor economy (1) ¡ (6).
As far as the consumption distribution is concerned, it is determined by
the standard complete-market condition that the ratio of marginal utilities
of any two agents is constant across time and states of nature. In fact, the
implications of the indivisible-labor model for the individual consumption
decisions are essentially the same as those for the divisible-labor model with
14strictly concave preferences considered in Maliar and Maliar (2003a). An ex-
ample of an analytic construction of the subfunction V for the divisible-labor
quasi-linear economy (9) ¡ (11) is provided in Maliar and Maliar (2003b),
under the assumption that individual utility functions are given by identical
power members of the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) class.
(See, also, Maliar and Maliar, 2003a, for a discussion of other examples).
Regarding hours worked, we have that the property of quasi-linearity
leads to corner solutions for the individual hours worked. Indeed, according
to condition (15), the optimal labor behavior of an agent is to work the max-
imum number of hours possible, ns
t = n, when her productivity is high, to
work zero hours, ns
t =0 , when her productivity is low and to work any num-
ber of hours, ns
t 2 [0;n], when her productivity satis…es optimality condition
(15) with equality, which corresponds to an interior equilibrium. In terms
of the indivisible-labor economy, we equivalently have that agents work with
probability one, 's
t =1 , in high-productivity states, with probability zero,
's
t =0 , in low-productivity states, and can choose any probability 's
t 2 [0;1]
in an interior equilibrium. Assuming that idiosyncratic shocks are randomly
drawn from a distribution with a continuous density function, as is typically
done in the literature, we obtain that the set of agents with interior optimal
15allocations for hours worked (equivalently, for the probability of employment)
has a Lebesgue measure zero. Thus, the labor choices of almost all the agents
are at corners.
In the presence of corner solutions, the standard aggregation techniques
cannot be used. We therefore provide no results about the possibility of ana-
lytical construction of the subfunction W for a general set of welfare weights,
f¸
sg
s2S. In some cases, it might be possible to construct the subfunction W
analytically, by imposing additional (very strong) restrictions, as for exam-
ple, by assuming a temporary heterogeneity in productivities, which has no
e¤ect on the individual equilibrium allocations, other than working hours, as
is done in Cho (1995), (see also Maliar and Maliar, 2003b, for a discussion).
In general, we can construct the subfunction W numerically, by computing
a solution to optimality condition (15) for all possible sets of the aggregate





We shall now discuss the relation between our results and those estab-
lished by Hansen (1985) for the benchmark indivisible-labor model with
identical (constant-productivity) consumers. Consider the following one-








where A ´ ($(1 ¡ n) ¡ $(1))=n: The following result can be shown.
Proposition 3 (Hansen, 1985). Assume that the agents in the indivisible-
labor economy (1)¡(6) have identical additive utility functions (8), identical
constant productivities, ¯
s
t =1for all s, t, and identical endowments. If an
equilibrium exists and it is interior, then the aggregate equilibrium behavior
of this economy is described by the one-consumer divisible-labor quasi-linear
model (16).
Proof. L e tu ss h o wh o wt h i sr e s u l tc a nb ea c c o m m o d a t e di no u rg e n e r a l
framework. Since the agents are identical, they have identical welfare weights,
¸
s =1for all s.F r o m d e … n i t i o n (14), we therefore obtain that V = v,u p
to an additive constant from integration. Furthermore, as an equilibrium is
interior, condition (15) holds with equality, W1 (ht)=A, and thus, we have
that W (ht)=Aht, again, up to an additive constant from integration.
In other words, if agents are identical in all respects, except in the real-
ization of employment lotteries, then at the aggregate level, the indivisible-
labor economy behaves as if there was a representative consumer who has
17a divisible-labor choice and whose utility function is linear in hours worked
(leisure). What is the intuition that underlies this result? The probabilities
of employment enter the individual utility functions linearly. Furthermore,
the labor productivity of agents remains constant during all periods. In an
interior equilibrium, condition (15) holds with equality for all t, s,a n da g e n t s
are indi¤erent between any sequences of employment probabilities that imply
the same expected amount of work. In particular, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium in which all agents choose the same probability of employment,
i.e., 's
t = 't = ht=n for all t, s. Therefore, there exists a representative con-
sumer whose lifetime utility function is linear in the average probability of
employment (aggregate labor), which is precisely the result shown in Hansen
(1985).5
The equivalence between the heterogeneous-agent versions of the indivis-
ible and divisible-labor economies shown in the present paper, is concerned
only with individual behavior and is therefore weaker than the one estab-
lished by Hansen (1985) for the homogeneous-agent case. Indeed, we show
in Proposition 1 that each agent in the heterogeneous-agent indivisible-labor
5An interior equilibrium in Hansen’s (1985) model is not uniquely determined in the
sense that there are in…nitely many sequences for the individual probabilities of employ-
ment that satisfy the equilibrium conditions. However, all such sequences lead to the same
aggregate equilibrium dynamics, which are described by the model (16). See Maliar and
Maliar (2000, 2003b) for a discussion on this point.
18economy behaves as if she had a divisible-labor choice and her utility function
was linear in leisure. This result does not imply however that the aggregate
behavior of the indivisible-labor economy is described by the divisible-labor
quasi-linear model (16). According to Proposition 2, it is described by the
model (13) ¡ (15). As we have argued above, in the presence of corner so-
lutions for the individual working hours, the social utility function in such
a model is a complicated object, which depends not only on the aggregate





4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the implications of a dynamic general-equilibrium model
with indivisible labor and heterogeneous agents. We assume that agents
di¤er in their initial wealth and that their labor productivities are sub-
ject to idiosyncratic shocks. We show that the behavior of each agent in
our indivisible-labor economy can be described by a quasi-linear utility-
maximization problem. The equivalence result, which we establish for the
heterogeneous-agent case, is weaker than the one shown in Hansen (1985)
for the economy with identical (constant-productivity) consumers. To be
speci…c, in Hansen’s (1985) economy, we have not only that each individual
behaves as if her labor choice was divisible and her utility function was quasi-
19linear, but also that the economy, as a whole, behaves as a one-consumer
divisible-labor quasi-linear economy. In our heterogeneous-agent economy,
we have equivalence only at the individual level. As regards the aggregate
dynamics, the social utility function depends on both aggregate variables and
heterogeneity parameters and is not, in general, quasi-linear.
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5 Appendix
In this section, we provide the proof of Proposition 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . First, the pro…t-maximization condition of






22Secondly, we derive the individual First-Order Conditions (FOCs) by us-






















































subject to (2), (3), (4);





t from the budget constraints (2) and (3), respectively, and substitute
them into the objective function of the problem (18).T h eF O C sw i t hr e s p e c t
to the unemployment insurance holdings, the capital holdings in the two























































































t ;1 ¡ n) ¡ u(c
s;u
t ;1) ¡ u1(c
s;e









t =0 ; (22)
&
s




t =0 ; (23)
³
s
t ¸ 0 and ³
s
t (1 ¡ '
s
t)=0 ; (24)




the Lagrange multipliers associated with the restrictions 's
t ¸ 0 and 's
t · 1,
respectively.
Finally, the pro…t maximization of the production …rm (5) implies that
the equilibrium pro…t is zero and that the equilibrium prices of capital and
labor are equal to the respective marginal products, i.e.,
rt = @f (kt;h t)=@kt and wt = @f (kt;h t)=@ht: (25)
The result (17) together with (19) gives us the risk-sharing condition:
u1 (c
s;e
t ;1 ¡ n)=u1 (c
s;u
t ;1): (26)
Equations (20), (21) and (26) therefore imply that the holdings of capital and










t+1 (Z) ´ ms
t+1 (Z). Substituting this
result into the two state-contingent constraints (2), (3) gives the equilibrium




















t ;1 ¡ n)(1¡ d + rt)=
= u1 (c
s;u










t ;1 ¡ n)=u1 (c
s;u
t ;1): (29)












(1 ¡ d + rt+1)
¤
:
where j 2f e;ug. Further, by using condition (27) and the result that the
holdings of capital and Arrow securities do not depend on the employment
status of the agent, we can replace the two state-contingent constraints (2),


























25Hence, the agent faces the same constraint (30) independently of whether
she is employed or not.
Assume now that the individual utility function, u, is additive and is
given by (8). Then, according to (26), consumption in the employed and





t. This implies that the budget
constraint (30) c a nb ew r i t t e na s(10). By substituting the updated version












(1 ¡ d + rt+1)
¤
: (31)
Similarly, by substituting the updated version of (29) into (21),w eo b t a i n
the standard complete-market condition, implying that the ratio of marginal
















t, we can re-write (22) as follows:













t satisfy restrictions (23) and (24), respectively.
As a …nal step, consider the recursive formulation of the individual prob-
































subject to (10), (11):
The solution to the problem (34) is described by FOCs (31) ¡ (33),w h e r e
A ´ [$(1 ¡ n) ¡ $(1)]=n and ns
t ´ n's
t. This completes the proof.
27